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A deepening securitisation of aid? © Prospect magazine
August 2010, an internal Department for International Development (DFID) paper was leaked that pointed to a
significant shift in Britain’s aid policy. In particular it was muted that development projects would be expected to
make the ‘maximum possible contribution’ to British national security. This revelation caused outrage amongst many
NGOs. Oxfam, Action Aid, Christian Aid, Save the Children Fund and Cafod responded swiftly, lodging their
concerns about national security interests being put at the heard of aid policy in a joint letter to the Guardian
newspaper. This reaction was understandable but in some ways surprising – surprising because the links between
security and aid have already converged considerably since the events of 9/11. Moreover, these processes of
securitising aid were already well underway from the late 1980s onwards in the context of the `New Wars’. What is
different from September 2001 onwards is that this securitisation of aid has extended beyond the niche of post-
conflict countries to aid and development policy more broadly. By the securitisation of aid we understand the
increasing absorption of global and national security interests into the framing, justification, design and
implementation of aid and development policies.
What are the signs then of this deepening securitisation of aid? We can observe the deepening securitisation of aid
in the statements of political leaders at the macro-level, in the documentation and institutional arrangements of
development agencies at the meso-level, and in the operational programming at the micro-level.
At the macro-level, politicians and national leaders since 9/11 have made public statements linking poverty and
alienation with terrorism, thereby connecting international development to national security goals. For example, in
November 2004 in an interview for an ITV documentary, the then UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown,
spoke of poverty as a `breeding ground for discontent’. Similarly then UK Prime Minister Tony Blair stated in a
speech to Congress on July 17th 2003, “The threat comes because, in another part of the globe…, where a third of
our planet lives in poverty…and where a fanatical strain of religious extremism has arisen…and because in the
combination of these afflictions, a new and deadly virus has emerged. That virus is terrorism”.
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These kinds of statements both by UK political leaders and politicians in the USA and other Western countries have
laid the ideological ground for a gradual shift in UK aid policy that has brought together protecting national and
global security interests with the delivery of aid and development. This can be observed in the documentation of
bilateral developmental agencies, in the direction of aid flows and in the increasing cooperation between
development, foreign policy and defence institutions. First, in terms of documentation, in 2005, for example, the
Department for International Development (DFID) released its strategy on Fighting Poverty to Build a Safer World: A
Strategy for Security and Development. In the foreword to this report, the then Secretary of State for International
Development, Hilary Been, stated: “In recent years, DFID has begun to bring security into the heart of its thinking
and practice. But we need to do more”. While prioritising poverty reduction, the strategy nevertheless underlines the
need to make development and security goals `mutually reinforcing’, a desire which has in turn fed into policy
formulation, institutional arrangements and programming.
Second, we note a substantial increase since 9/11 in the volume of aid to countries at the frontline of the war on
terror, such as Afghanistan, Iraq and more recently Pakistan. Indeed, this is a part of a broader shift in aid policy
towards fragile states, which are seen as particularly susceptible to manipulation by terrorist forces. Iraq became the
top recipient of UK bilateral aid in 2003-2004, amounting to £209 million, thereby usurping India from its leading
position the year before. In 2006 Afghanistan ranked among the top three recipients of UK bilateral aid at £134
million, rising from fourth position in 2005 at £121 million. Significantly neither Afghanistan nor Iraq were among the
UK’s top 20 recipients of net bilateral ODA before 2002. Indeed Iraq did not receive any bilateral aid before 2002.
Thus the rising importance of Afghanistan and Iraq as recipients of UK overseas development aid reflects these
linkages between development, security and foreign policy.
Third, the convergence of aid and security in aid practice is also reflected in the increasing co-operation between
development, defence and foreign policy institutions, a pattern that has also characterised the development of US
aid policy over the last decade. Like other countries, the UK has adopted a `whole-of-government’ approach to deal
with the perceived terrorist threat. Some of the earliest institutions established to implement this approach were the
Global and African Conflict and Prevention Pools, which were set up in 2001 to bring together the resources and
expertise of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), DFID and the Ministry of Defence. These pools
supported policing in Sierra Leone, disarmament programmes, and assistance to the African Union peace support
operations in Darfur.
Another key `joined-up’ institution, set up in 2004, was the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit, which brought
together DFID, the FCO and the Ministry of Defence. Influenced by the post-invasion instability in Iraq, the Unit
shifted its focus away from immediate post-conflict development work towards providing assessment and
operational expertise for stabilisation operations and was renamed the Stabilisation Unit in September 2007.
These meso-level manifestations of increased convergence between aid and security interests have also become
translated at the operational micro-level into specific institutions, programme and projects. At the operational level
the UK government has fostered closer civil-military co-operation in development and humanitarian assistance
through the creation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), primarily in Afghanistan and Iraq. These have
provoked considerable concerns amongst international and local NGOs involved in humanitarian and development
work. Military engagement in humanitarian and development work for the purposes of `hearts and minds’ work has,
from the perspective of NGOs, compromised their positions as declared independent and neutral actors, and
contributed to a rise in attacks on humanitarian workers.  There has also been enhanced investment in education in
Muslim-majority countries as a strategy to counter the spread of radical political Islam. Part of this tactic has been
aid to support the reform of curricula used in madrassas as well as an attempt to court moderate Muslim leaders in
Muslim-majority countries.
Action Aid, Oxfam, Christian Aid and others were right to lodge their concerns in the Guardian about the
securitisation of aid. Putting national security interests at the heart of aid policy has considerable implications for
development institutions, whether governmental or non-governmental, and for civil society actors. As we have
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pointed out above, however, the securitisation of aid was well underway before the election of the new coalition
government and has deepened with alacrity since 9/11. If this further deepening and consolidation of a securitisation
of aid goes ahead under the new coalition government, then development institutions should rightly be worried. The
prime challenge this poses for bilateral development institutions is how they can maintain a focus on poverty
reduction when under pressure from their governments to give greater priority to global and national security
interests.
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